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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the Monsanto Company’s corporate public affairs and government 
relations strategies to understand current litigation on Roundup’s carcinogenic effects. The 
research analyzes previously confidential internal company documents from The Monsanto 
Company Archives and recently released federal court litigation documents known as The 
Monsanto Papers to trace corporate influence. This research examines Monsanto’s strategy to 
influence scientific information, regulatory bodies, public opinion, and the university 
partnerships that served as a major liability for the company in contemporary court cases. 
Monsanto’s ghost-writing and regulatory body manipulation practices for the commercialization 
of biotechnology products such as Roundup serve as a vital case study for both businesses and 
consumers. 
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 1 
CHAPTER ONE: Introduction 
Introduction 
 
Dewayne Anthony Lee Johnson lived a healthy life in Vallejo, California. He worked as 
an integrated pest manager at a local school. Lee’s day to day tasks consisted of catching wildlife 
on the grounds, addressing irrigation issues, and other necessary maintenance work. One of his 
other crucial job responsibilities was spraying herbicides around the school to manage weed 
growth in the lawn. One day, the sprayer he used to disperse Roundup, a Monsanto herbicide, 
broke and he was drenched in the chemical product. He immediately washed the liquid off and 
resumed working on the school grounds.1 
Soon lesions developed across Lee’s body: on his lips, across his face, and all over his 
arms and legs. Lee immediately went to the doctor’s office, and after a multitude of tests and 
referrals, he got the ill-fated news of his cancer diagnosis. Lee’s mind immediately went to his 
regular usage of Roundup. After several failed attempts to contact the Monsanto Company for 
answers, Lee filed a lawsuit against the company in 2014 for causing his deadly form of non-
Hodgkin lymphoma.2 
Lee’s lawsuit argued that Monsanto knew, or should have known, the harmful effects of 
the main active ingredient in Roundup, glyphosate, and contended the company suppressed 
research about the dangerous effects of glyphosate and Roundup.3 In August 2018, a San 
Francisco state jury unanimously found that Monsanto failed to warn of Roundup’s carcinogenic 
dangers. In the official jury verdict form, the jury answered “Yes” to whether Monsanto knew, or 
 
1 Carey Gillam, “I Won a Historic Lawsuit, But May Not Live to Get the Money,” Time, (November 21, 2018). 
2 Ibid. 
3 “First Monsanto Roundup Trial Starts in June 2018 in San Francisco,” Baum Hedlund Aristei & Goldman, 
accessed March 18, 2020, https://www.baumhedlundlaw.com/first-monsanto-roundup-trial-june-18/. 
 2 
should have reasonably known, that Roundup was dangerous and if Monsanto failed to warn 
consumers of the dangers.4 Evidence from the trial revealed the unethical ghost-writing of 
scientific papers to assert the safety of Monsanto products, plans to discredit regulatory agency 
findings naming glyphosate a probable human carcinogen, and numerous other unethical 
attempts to influence regulatory bodies. 
A key deciding factor for the jury in the trial was Monsanto’s influence on the scientific 
community to propel biotechnology and Roundup commercialization. Judge Curtis Karnow 
made it clear in his order before the trial that jurors consider not only what caused Johnson’s 
cancer, but also whether Monsanto concealed evidence of risks in its pesticide products.5 The 
judge’s order stated that “the internal correspondence noted by Johnson could support a jury 
finding that Monsanto has long been aware of the risk that its glyphosate-based herbicides are 
carcinogenic…but has continuously sought to influence the scientific literature to prevent its 
internal concerns from reaching the public sphere and to bolster its defenses in product liability 
actions.”6 Monsanto’s corporate strategy to shape scientific literature influenced the jury in its 
decision, and revealed how the company’s flawed strategy presented a major liability in its 
defense in the courtroom. 
The jury awarded Lee $289 million as reparations for the pesticide’s health effects. In 
October 2018, the court cut reparations to $78 million. Later, in November 2018, Monsanto 
appealed to overturn the decision and grant a new trial, but thousands of other individuals 
already filed cases against Monsanto.7 The plaintiffs argue, similar to Lee, that Monsanto’s 
 
4 “Johnson vs. Monsanto Verdict Form,” Baum Hedlund Aristei & Goldman, accessed March 18, 2020, 
 https://www.baumhedlundlaw.com/pdf/monsanto-documents/johnson-trial/Johnson-vs-Monsanto-Verdict-
Form.pdf. 
5 “Judge’s order in Johnson Case ahead of trial”, U.S. Right to Know, May, 17, 2018, last modified March 24, 2020, 
https://usrtk.org/monsanto-papers/state-court/. 
6 Ibid., 45. 
7 Carey Gillam, "I Won a Historic Lawsuit, But May Not Live to Get the Money," Time, (November 21, 2018). 
 3 
herbicides are not safe, the company was aware of dangers, and Monsanto took steps to conceal 
information from regulators and the public.8 As of December 2019, approximately 42,700 people 
have filed suits against the Monsanto Company.9 
Lee’s trial was in a state court, and the most recent development in his proceedings has 
been a counter appeal by Lee in response to the Monsanto appeal. Another state case, Pilliod v. 
Monsanto, in May 2019, resulted in a verdict of $2 billion in damages, but was later cut to a total 
of $87 million. 10 There are more state court dates scheduled in 2020 and 2021. On the federal 
level, the plaintiffs have also had success. The March 2019 case of Hardeman v. Monsanto 
resulted in the jury finding that Roundup was a “substantial factor” in the development of 
Hardeman’s cancer, and returned a verdict of $80 million in damages, that the court later reduced 
to approximately $25 million. 11 The next federal court case, as of this writing, is scheduled for 
May 2020.12 
How did this happen to a leading agricultural and biotechnology producer such as 
Monsanto? This research’s goal is to demonstrate how the practices found in the Monsanto 
Roundup trials are a part of a larger corporate strategy of government relations and influence at 
the Monsanto company, ultimately leading to blurring the lines of regulators and other 
government oversight agencies. This research also investigates the relationship and influence 
between Monsanto and educational institutions. The breakdown between the regulated and the 
regulators by the Monsanto Company ultimately posed a liability to the business, evidenced by 
the numerous trials and jury’s decisions against Monsanto. This research will utilize the 
 
8 Ibid. 
9 “Monsanto Roundup Trial Tracker,” U.S. Right to Know, last modified February 26, 2020, 
https://usrtk.org/monsanto-roundup-trial-tracker-index/. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
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Monsanto Company’s deep history and current legal battles as a historical and contemporary 
case to serve as a powerful example for businesspeople, corporations, and educators, on ethical 
government relations and corporate influence. 
This research will first start with an in-depth literature review to provide context to 
current academic literature and valuable scientific journals on the subject. The hypothesis then 
follows, with a thorough overview of the research methodology. A systematic analysis into 
released Monsanto legal documents from the trial follows to provide further context for the 
contemporary narrative. Utilizing Monsanto Company Records at Washington University in St. 
Louis Special Collection Archives, a history of the Monsanto government relations department is 
traced, along with corporate public affairs and media relations, as a way to influence public 
opinion, scientific communities, and regulatory bodies for the commercialization of 
biotechnology. The research continues with an overview of Monsanto university relations 
history, methods, and initiatives. 
Literature Review and Situation Analysis 
 
 The literature review is broken up according to various subcategories to give a broad 
context to the current research as follows: Monsanto Company background, agricultural and 
biotechnology industry context, and scientific publications. This research is unique among 
current literature through its use of recently released legal documents, known as the Monsanto 
Papers, in combination with company archival documents from the 1950s to the 1980s, to trace 
Monsanto corporate influence. The research utilized both contemporary and historical sources to 
demonstrate how the Monsanto Company systematically influenced regulatory bodies, scientific 
communities, and public opinion for years to shape its biotechnology commercialization. 
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However, as demonstrated in contemporary court cases, the influence and regulatory breakdown 
shaped the court rulings and revealed the flawed corporate strategy. 
The Monsanto Company Background 
 
Carey Gillam’s Whitewash: The Story of a Weed Killer, Cancer, and the Corruption of 
Science is the seminal text on how Monsanto’s Roundup came to dominate the farming industry 
and described the various environmental and health concerns that have arisen. Gillam, an 
environmental investigative journalist, recounted the financial incentives in place to keep using 
glyphosate and depicts how the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), and numerous scientific journals engaged in corruption and 
deception that has allowed agricultural and chemical executives to put tremendous pressure on 
regulatory agencies. This pressure often resulted in altered regulations that negatively affected 
the consumers and citizens the institutions were sworn to protect. Through her work, Gillam set 
the stage for this research by providing a background on Monsanto and an analysis of the current 
issues the company faces. This research extends her work, through a focus on government 
relations, a topic she touches on, but not through an additional historical and university relations 
approach.13 
Leemon McHenry, a bioethicist and lecturer at California State University - Northridge, 
penned an article that laid a solid foundation for this research. McHenry examined de-classified 
files from Monsanto that were used in toxic tort litigation to investigate the impact of 
Monsanto’s efforts to influence scientific studies on glyphosate and Roundup. McHenry 
examined 141 recently released documents from the Baum Hedlund Aristei & Goldman law 
 
13 Carey Gillam, Whitewash: The Story of a Weed Killer, Cancer, and the Corruption of Science (Washington, DC: 
Island Press, 2017). 
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firm. After careful review, the author concluded that the documents revealed Monsanto-
sponsored ghost-writing of articles, peer review corruption, and other influences used to defend 
Monsanto’s products. McHenry made a point to mention that he could not weigh in on the 
carcinogenic effects of glyphosate, but mentioned that if Monsanto were confident in its 
products, there would be no need to go to such lengths to conceal details about the materials used 
in its products. McHenry concluded that much of the science surrounding Roundup has been 
artificially financed by Monsanto to advance its own interests.14 The research added to 
McHenry’s findings through an additional analysis of The Monsanto Papers, with added archival 
sources to historically trace the findings. 
The Baum Hedlund Aristei & Goldman law firm, which represents many clients suing 
Monsanto, uncovered The Monsanto Papers through court discovery measures. Specifically, 
many of the lawsuits attempt to link Roundup to causing non-Hodgkin lymphoma. The 
documents were obtained through legal discovery and include internal Monsanto emails, text 
messages, company reports, studies, and other documents. On March 13, 2017, US District 
Judge Vince Chhabria unsealed the documents obtained by plaintiffs in the Monsanto Roundup 
multidistrict litigation. Another group of documents was made public on August 1, 2017. 
Ultimately, the 141 released files were an invaluable source of primary data as a way to 
investigate Monsanto ghost-writing, scientific alterations, and corporate influence. The 
documents are categorized according to charts and are in chronological order, which served as a 
valuable source for this research.15 
 
14 Leemon B. McHenry, “The Monsanto Papers: Poisoning the Scientific Well,” International Journal of Risk & 
Safety in Medicine 29, no. 3/4 (January 2018): 193–205. 
15 “Monsanto Papers Secret Documents,” Baum Hedlund Aristei & Goldman, accessed March 2, 2020, 
https://www.baumhedlundlaw.com/toxic-tort-law/monsanto-roundup-lawsuit/monsanto-secret-documents/. 
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Agricultural and Biotechnology Industry Context 
 
Business Communications Company (BCC) Research is a public relations and marketing 
firm that publishes market research reports annually, which have provided vital industry 
background to this research. Their 2018 report provided background on Monsanto and 
predictions of the future of the agricultural and biotechnology industry. From 2013-2017 the 
“global pesticide and other agricultural chemicals market grew” from $125.3 billion to $161.9 
billion, citing emerging markets in China and Brazil as the main drivers. 16 Experts predict the 
industry to grow to $224.6 billion in 2021.17 Key predicted drivers of this are general economic 
growth and increased demand for food products, while restraints include concern about the 
effects on the environment. The report specifically mentioned that using agricultural chemicals 
“may cause serious health risks to humans.”18 Additionally, the report stated that in September 
2016, Bayer AG, a German drug and chemical maker, announced its intent to acquire Monsanto 
with sale completion in June 2018, which reinforced Bayer’s dominant position in the 
marketplace.19 
The March 2017 BCC Research report gave additional company insights, predictions, 
and chemical company backgrounds. The biotechnology seed segment made up the largest share 
of the market, with an estimated size of $24.8 billion, and was forecasted to reach about $38.8 
billion by 2022.20 Increasing worldwide food demand, a drive for higher agricultural yields, a 
growing number of countries that allow biotech crops, and the development of innovative 
 
16 “Pesticide And Other Agricultural Chemicals Market Global Briefing 2018,” The Business Research Company 
(Publisher), (January 2018): 7-8. https://www-bccresearch-com.proxy.lib.ohio-state.edu/epublish/index/market-
briefs%20details/mbreport/AR~~Hu62CTA==. 
17 Ibid., 9. 
18 Ibid., 10. 
19 Ibid., 19-20.  
20 “Agricultural Biotechnology: Emerging Technologies and Global Markets,” TBRC (Publisher), (Mar 2017): 30, 
https://www-bccresearch-com.proxy.lib.ohio-state.edu/market-research/biotechnology/agricultural-biotechnology-
markets-report-bio100c.html. 
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biotechnology tools are the fundamental driving forces for the growth of agricultural 
biotechnology industry.21 
Bayer AG is one of the world’s largest chemical and healthcare companies. Bayer AG’s 
three business segments are Healthcare, Covestro, and Crop Science. Bayer AG specializes in 
producing genetically modified seeds in production sites outside of Europe.22 The Monsanto 
Company develops genetic materials for seed companies and produces herbicides. Monsanto’s 
two central business units are agricultural productivity, and seeds and genomics. Agricultural 
productivity is the smaller portion, making up 26 percent of 2016 revenues, but includes the 
Roundup and glyphosate products.23 The principal strategy for Monsanto is its expansion to non-
US countries such as Mexico, Canada, Argentina, and Brazil. The BCC literature provided 
important business context and depicted the immense impact and power that Monsanto, through 
the products and chemicals it created, had and continues to have on millions of consumers 
around the world. The widespread impact was essential to understand the scope of the unethical 
historical and contemporary business practices. 
Scientific Publications 
 
Charles Benbrook, former Washington State University professor and agricultural 
economist, authored research on the significance of the glyphosate chemical and its effect on 
millions of people. The author concluded that from 1974 to 2016, farmers and other users 
applied over 1.6 billion kilograms of glyphosate in the United States. Since the Roundup-ready 
crop introduction in 1996, the chemical’s usage has increased fifteenfold. Additionally, the 
 
21 Ibid., 101. 
22 Ibid., 175. 
23 Ibid., 198. 
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author pointed out that a majority of glyphosate applied in the US was applied in the last ten 
years. The introduction of genetically modified crops to work with glyphosate has increased the 
chemical’s usage. Glyphosate will remain the most used herbicide worldwide for years to come, 
and as a result, will lead to prolonged environmental and health effects. Benbrook’s article set 
the stage for the importance of this research, as the findings show the tremendous global impact 
of both Roundup and Monsanto.24 
The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) is an intergovernmental 
agency forming part of the World Health Organization (WHO) of the United Nations. Its role is 
to conduct and coordinate research into the causes of cancer. The organization also collects and 
publishes surveillance data regarding the occurrence of cancer worldwide. The IARC released a 
report in 2015 detailing the effects of glyphosate, the active ingredient in Monsanto’s Roundup. 
The chemical glyphosate is a “colourless, odorless, crystalline solid. It is formulated as a salt 
consisting of deprotonated acid of glyphosate and a cation.”25 The glyphosate chemical was first 
synthesized in 1950, but its herbicidal properties were not discovered until 1970.26 The use of 
glyphosate is widespread, as there are “more than 750 products containing glyphosate for sale in 
the USA alone.”27  
There has not been significant regulation of glyphosate, as the EPA decided in 1993 that 
it did not pose any adverse effects to humans. However, the 2015 IARC findings challenged 
several long-standing assumptions regarding the chemical. First, it concluded that there is 
 
24 Charles M. Benbrook, “Trends in Glyphosate Herbicide Use in the United States and Globally,” Environmental 
Sciences Europe, no. 1 (2016): 1. 
25 IARC, “Glyphosate,” In: Some Organophosphate Insecticides and Herbicides: Diazinon, Glyphosate, Malathion, 
Parathion, Tetrachlorvinphos. IARC Working Group, March 3-10, 2015, Lyon (France). The World Health 
Organization (WHO), the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) IARC Monographs on the 
Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans. 2015. 
26 Ibid., 322. 
27 Ibid., 322. 
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“limited evidence in humans for the carcinogenicity of glyphosate.”28 Additionally, there was 
“sufficient evidence in experimental animals for the carcinogenicity of glyphosate.”29 The 
overall evaluation by the IARC was that “glyphosate is probably carcinogenic to humans.”30 This 
decision sent shock waves across the chemical industry and concerned consumers. Monsanto 
immediately attempted to discredit the findings. However, the IARC is composed of 
independent, unbiased scientists, and serves an unchallenged expert in the field. The IARC 
finding of glyphosate’s probable carcinogenic effects represented a departure from the current 
literature regarding the safety of Roundup and Monsanto products and shaped Monsanto’s 
contemporary regulatory, government relations, and media relations strategies. 
  
 
28 Ibid., 398. 
29 Ibid., 398. 
30 Ibid., 398. 
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CHAPTER TWO: Methods 
Hypothesis and Predictions 
 
The unethical business practices found in the Monsanto Roundup trials are a part of a 
larger historical precedent of influence at the Monsanto Company. The strategies Monsanto used 
from the 1950s onwards eventually failed the company in the courtroom. This research goes 
beyond a historical analysis to investigate current court cases and literature. The research 
analyzes the history of the dynamic corporate control of scientific information, influence on 
regulatory bodies, manipulation of public opinion, and creation of university partnerships to 
piece together how the business strategy backfired on the Monsanto Company through numerous 
contemporary court cases. 
Monsanto represents the modern trend in corporations to have a strategy based on 
breaking down barriers between corporate entities and regulators, with businesses often believing 
it is in their best interest to manage these involvements to quicken regulatory approval and reap 
higher profits. However, for Monsanto, this strategy has proven to be incredibly flawed. Through 
the thousands of filed court cases it is evident that the corporate strategy made consumers 
question the safety of Monsanto’s products. When consumers turned to independent bodies and 
scientists, and learned of Monsanto’s influence, the company lost objective validation and public 
trust. Ultimately, Monsanto’s corporate public affairs departments and unethical business 
practices, despite their intentions, increased liabilities for the firm in the courtroom and represent 
a flawed corporate strategy. 
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Methodology 
 
 The research methodology involved qualitative historical research processes. The 
Monsanto Papers were used as primary sources to detail the rise of contemporary Monsanto 
ghost-writing and unethical business practices. The Monsanto Papers were recently released 
through court cases and provide ample opportunity to show the result of business practices and 
the influence of corporate government relations on scientific and regulatory bodies.  
Other qualitative research focused on The Monsanto Company Records, examined at the 
Washington University in St. Louis Special Collections Library. The researcher obtained 
permission from Bayer AG (Monsanto) to visit the archives and utilize the files for this research. 
The researcher conducted a three-day research trip, made possible through The Ohio State 
University History Department’s Honors Thesis Research Grant, to investigate the Monsanto 
company’s history of government relations and corporate public affairs. Through these sources, 
the researcher constructed a history of the rise of government relations with a focus on specific 
strategic plans to influence regulatory bodies, public opinion, and educational institutions during 
the 1980s.  
This research investigates the roots of unethical business practices at the Monsanto 
Company. Though this research did not utilize formal ethical frameworks, the distinction 
between unethical and illegal business practices was vital. Whereas unethical business practices 
indicate a moral wrong and ambiguity, illegal business practices are a clear legal violation. When 
analyzing The Monsanto Papers and The Monsanto Company Records, the researcher used as 
grounds for unethical business behavior the basis of deception and failing to honor a company’s 
and product’s commitment to the safety of its consumers. Monsanto outlined the safety 
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responsibility to its consumers in annual and corporate responsibility reports spanning back 
decades. For example, in the 1979 Annual Report CEO John W. Hanley stated that “while the 
government has a proper role to play in establishing acceptable standards of industrial conduct, 
no one can relieve us of the primary responsibility for the safety of our own products and 
processes.”31 
For this research ghost-writing is considered an unethical practice, though it is not 
considered an illegal practice by all established sources, due to its deliberate deception and 
presentation of scientific work to consumers. Additionally, though most corporations partake in 
public affairs activities to advance corporate agendas, Monsanto utilized unethical business 
practices as it failed in its commitment to consumers on the safety of its products. Monsanto 
aggressively influenced biotechnology regulations for its products to hasten commercialization 
and escalated its efforts over time from lobbying work, to ghost-writing, and to deliberate 
suppression of opposing scientific work. The distinction of unethical business practices was vital 
for the research, as plans and strategies Monsanto used in the 1950s to the 1980s and into the 21st 
century contributed to the breakdown of unbiased scientific and regulatory bodies. The 
breakdown and deception were ultimately Monsanto’s biggest liability in the courtroom and 
were instrumental in influencing juries’ decisions against Monsanto.  
 
31 “Monsanto Company 1979 Annual Report,” Mergent Archives, (December 31, 1979): 8. 
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CHAPTER THREE: Analysis and Results 
The Monsanto Papers 
 
 The Monsanto Papers, or so-called Monsanto Secret Documents, were obtained via 
discovery in the trial by the Baum Hedlund Aristei & Goldman law firm. The papers document 
internal Monsanto emails, reports, memos, and text messages that reveal insights into the 
practices used for regulatory and scientific influence at the corporation. The main areas of focus 
for this analysis are the following: regulatory and governmental bodies, media and public 
relations responses, and ghost-writing evidence. Before tracing the historical context of 
government relations at Monsanto it is vital to understand the issues surfacing in the 
contemporary trials to grasp the complete story of corporate influence. 
Regulatory and Governmental Bodies 
 
 In 1985, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) completed a 
consensus review of glyphosate, the main active ingredient within the Roundup product, to 
review its safety in public usage.32 The review analyzed a 26-month rat study that observed 
tumors in rats exposed to glyphosate in addition to mutagenicity tests.33 The group concluded 
based on the studies that “it is very unlikely that the glyphosate test group is consistent with any 
historical controls,” indicating a change in accepted scientific thought about the safety of 
glyphosate.34 Thus, per established guidelines, the EPA classified glyphosate as a “class C 
‘possible human carcinogen’ because of kidney adenomas in male mice.”35 Monsanto 
 
32 EPA Memo on Consensus View of Glyphosate, page 1, March 4, 1985, from The Monsanto Papers through court 
discovery procedures by Baum Hedlund Aristei & Goldman [here and after The Monsanto Papers]. 
33 Ibid., 2. 
34 Ibid., 3. 
35 EPA Letter Reviewing Proposal to Classify Glyphosate as Class C Possible Human Carcinogen, page 1, April 3, 
1985, The Monsanto Papers. 
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immediately attempted to counter the claim by submitting a lengthy document in 1986 to 
convince the scientific community “that glyphosate is not an oncogen.”36 
Monsanto’s influence on regulatory bodies continued into the twenty-first century. For 
example, in 2000, Monsanto email correspondences document that the company was working to 
alter government websites on glyphosate. The email stated that “how about the CAL EPA site 
that claims glyphosate causes tumors - yes a government site - we are working behind the scenes 
to get that changed!”37 Furthermore, Dan Jenkins, Monsanto Company Director of Regulatory 
Affairs, wrote in April 2015 that Jess Rowland, Former Deputy Division Director of the EPA’s 
Office of Pesticide Programs, called him and said, “if I can kill this I should get a medal,” 
referring to another government agency’s proposed review of glyphosate.38 These are vital 
examples of Monsanto countering established scientific thought about its products and attempts 
to influence agency regulation. 
 After the 2015 IARC decision that labeled glyphosate as a possible carcinogen, Monsanto 
launched another plan to counter scientific work on glyphosate. Monsanto hoped to “invalidate 
relevance of IARC,” a highly regarded scientific body.39 Additionally, Monsanto hoped to make 
sure that the IARC “determination doesn't get more widely adopted within WHO.”40 Overall 
hoping to “prevent future bad IARC decisions on pesticides/GMOs.”41 The strategy to combat 
 
36 Monsanto Submission to EPA SAP in 1986: Information to Support Conclusion That Glyphosate is Not a Class C 
Oncogen. page 2, January 23, 1986, The Monsanto Papers. 
37 Email Correspondence from Donna Farmer to Janice Armstrong Concerning Government Website Influence, page 
1, April, 2001, The Monsanto Papers. 
38 Email Correspondence from Dan Jenkins and William Heydens Concerning Jess Rowland (EPA), page 2, April 
28, 2015, The Monsanto Papers. 
39 Internal Monsanto Document on IARC Follow Up Demonstrating Safety of Glyphosate, page 1, March 24, 2015, 
The Monsanto Papers. 
40 Ibid., 1.  
41 Ibid., 1. 
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IARC decisions, was a part of a broader corporate plan to invalidate and dismiss concerns from 
regulatory bodies to quicken the development of biotechnologies, at the expense of consumers. 
Media and Public Relations Responses 
 
 Monsanto planned several extensive media relations plans to shape public opinion of its 
products. One plan focused on reaction to Carey Gillam and her published works. Gillam is an 
investigative journalist, focusing on the modern-day food system and the environmental, 
governmental, and scientific effects that result from the system. Gillam is critical of the 
Monsanto Company in her works, citing the influence of regulatory bodies and ghost-writing 
practices as a result of unethical business practices. Monsanto organized an eight-person team in 
May 2017 from media, scientific affairs, and chemistry departments to devise a communications 
strategy for the release of Gillam’s Whitewash in October 2017.42 The main strategic goal was to 
“minimize impact of this book’s false claims made about Monsanto and Glyphosate” on 
stakeholders, policymakers, and societal audiences.43  
Additionally, an email exchange between a global business advisory firm and the 
Monsanto public relations team details more plans for the book release including a pop-up ad to 
a Monsanto sponsored blog post when a person searches “Monsanto Glyphosate Carey Gillam,” 
creating a “how to post book reviews email” to encourage Monsanto-supported negative reviews 
of the book, and making talking points for key third parties to more easily discredit the book.44 
Monsanto and the advisory firm produced a press release to the book, and within the edits, they 
wrote that “the author’s main flawed argument is that glyphosate is carcinogenic, which is based 
 
42 Issues Management and Communicating. Strategy for Carey Gillam’s “Whitewash”, page 3, May 2017, The 
Monsanto Papers. 
43 Ibid., 1-2. 
44 Email Correspondence from Adam Cubbage Adam and Cole Waggoner on “Whitewash” Action Items, page 1-2, 
September 10, 2017, The Monsanto Papers. 
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on the 2015 IARC classification.”45 Furthermore, they state that “to be clear: every regulatory 
agency in the world has concluded that glyphosate is safe to use,” a claim clearly disproved in 
the 2015 IARC report.46 Monsanto targeted Gillam’s work, and other potentially adverse 
publications, through strategic media relations to influence the public narrative and public 
opinion on glyphosate, Roundup, and biotechnologies in the company’s favor. 
Ghost-Writing Evidence 
 
In 1999, via email, William Heydens, a Monsanto Company Product Safety Assessment 
Strategy Lead, described a scientific outreach plan that was in development. Heydens wrote that 
one of the significant elements of the plan was to work with “outside scientific experts who are 
influential at driving science, regulators, public opinion, etc. We would have the people directly 
or indirectly/behind-the-scenes work on our behalf.”47 Additionally, in 2008, Dr. Charles 
Healthy emailed Drs. Farmer and Saltmiras, regarding an academic manuscript he was sent to 
peer review on the cytotoxicity of Roundup and glyphosate in rats from the Editor and Chief of 
the “Cell and Toxicology” journal.48 Dr. Healy wrote that “you two would be the reviewers in 
fact and I would then collate your comments and be the reviewer of record.”49 These two 
exchanges depicted the use of ghost-writing and unethical scientific practices by Monsanto 
employees to positively shape scientific literature on glyphosate and Roundup.  
Furthermore, in 2015, there was a series of email correspondences between Dr. John 
Acquavella, a Professor in Clinical Epidemiology at Aarhus University and former Monsanto 
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Company scientist, and Monsanto employees and consultants. In the email chain, Monsanto was 
not going to list Dr. Acquavella as an author on an expert panel review of the carcinogenic 
potential of the herbicide glyphosate, though he contributed substantially to the panel, due to his 
“prior employment at Monsanto.”50 However, Dr. Acquavella wrote back, saying that “we call 
that ghost writing and it is unethical” and that he “can't be a part of deceptive authorship on a 
presentation or publication.”51 Though Dr. Acquavella was eventually given credit as an author 
for the publication, this is another examples of Monsanto’s attempt to conduct ghost-writing 
activities. This is one of numerous examples that serve as crucial evidence indicating how the 
Monsanto Company systematically participated in ghost-writing and altered the scientific 
process, publication norms, and established literature to benefit its biotechnology 
commercialization. The practice was well established internally and has a long history in the 
company’s biotechnology strategy. For example, in 1987, a Monsanto plan advised to “ghost-
write OpEd pieces, [and] sample editorials.”52 
The Monsanto Papers consequently document a systematic plan by Monsanto to 
influence regulatory and governmental bodies, devise favorable strategic media and public 
relations responses, and actively support ghost-writing to influence the scientific thought and 
discussion surrounding glyphosate and biotechnologies. The contemporary analysis is clear that 
Monsanto has engaged in unethical business practices. However, it is necessary to conduct a 
historical analysis on the rise of government relations and public affairs strategies through 
archival documents to complete the larger historical context for how these contemporary 
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practices originated and developed at the Monsanto Company to culminate in present-day 
lawsuits and corporate liabilities. 
Washington University in St. Louis Monsanto Company Archives 
Rise of the Government Relations Department 
 
After analyzing the contemporary evidence regarding the current Monsanto legal battles, 
it is essential to look to the past to uncover the development of these practices. Through an 
analysis of previously internal Monsanto documents, a history on the rise of the company’s 
government relations department is constructed to demonstrate the foundations of the company’s 
flawed business strategy. Specifically, examples of Monsanto’s influence on regulatory and 
governmental bodies are evident through a greater understanding of the government relations 
plans and public affairs strategies that were developed and used from 1980 to 1989. 
Corporate Public Affairs Structure  
 
The Monsanto government relations department is a part of the company's larger 
corporate public affairs initiative. A summary of the initiatives that fall under corporate public 
affairs are those that enable “Monsanto’s corporate goals through professional communications 
which shape perceptions about Monsanto and create active support among important audiences 
for the corporation, its strategy and its activities.”53 Monsanto recognizes its stakeholders in this 
task are “shareowners, customers, employees, ...neighbors..., media, government officials, the 
financial community, and others whose actions affect the corporation.” 54 To shape said 
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perceptions surrounding the company, Monsanto staffed the corporate public affairs department 
with five St. Louis, six Washington D.C, and external Hill and Knowlton staff (a global public 
relations consulting firm), into five primary areas of activity: government relations, media 
relations, executive services, employee communications, science communications.55 It is vital to 
analyze the way Monsanto structured the various areas of activity to understand the systematic 
approach to government relations and public influence, and to provide context for the strategies 
and plans the departments implemented. Specifically, the government relations, media relations, 
and science communications demonstrated the corporate influence depicted in contemporary 
cases.  
According to Monsanto, government relations “includes federal government relations and 
lobbying for the corporation, state government relations, lobbying for corporate issues such as 
taxation, corporate governance, and other issues that cut across operating unit and subsidiary 
lines. It also includes the management of corporate political activity.”56 This definition clearly 
outlines the areas of interest for government relations from lobbying to regulatory influence. 
Furthermore, Monsanto clearly marked the differences between federal and state initiatives. 
 Federal government relations from Monsanto are with the desired response to “support 
Monsanto’s corporate strategy” through influencing “actions by decision makers in the 
legislative, regulatory and administrative branches of government in Washington D.C.” 57 The 
federal government relations staff was two-sided: serving as advocates in government on issues 
affecting Monsanto to “exploit opportunities that will benefit the company” and as counselors to 
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the company on national issues. 58 Federal government relations staff would “be experts on how 
the federal government works and how it can be ethically and legally influenced” to the meet the 
needs of the corporation. 59 Monsanto laid out several objectives to reach these goals through 
developing “short and long-term activities,” increasing contacts, monitoring D.C events, and 
utilizing “Monsanto senior management as advocates.”60 
 The desired response from the state government relations was to have “state government 
actions [that] will support Monsanto’s corporate strategy.” 61 The corporate arm of the state 
relations was to deal with “taxation, corporate governance, general environmental laws and 
regulations, employment.”62 Additionally, the state relations team focused on the “hiring and 
management of outside lobbyists who serve multiple clients within Monsanto.”63 The tactics to 
advance the Monsanto initiatives on the state level ranged from clarifying and communicating 
Monsanto company positions to “identify, hire, direct and monitor outside lobbyists in key 
states.”64 
 Federal and state government relations were critical arms of the corporate government 
relations at Monsanto and represent the company’s overarching goal and strategy to influence 
biotechnology regulation by creating close relations with governmental and regulatory bodies. 
The other four areas under corporate public affairs were also vital to advancing the corporation’s 
positive image to society. The media relations arm of the government relations department 
played a crucial role in communicating important information to relevant audiences about 
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Monsanto.65 The media relations team outlined a yearly message through a “planned, aggressive” 
communication strategy.66 Besides advancing the corporation’s business position, a noticeable 
objective used by the media relations team was to “protect Monsanto’s right to operate by 
improving public understanding of Monsanto’s environmental actions and community 
relations.”67  
An in-depth media relations plan crafted at the end of 1987 reveals in more detail how the 
department carried out the stated goals and objectives and serves as an outline for other media 
plans. Monsanto stated that it desired respect as a great company through both financial results 
and an outstanding reputation.68 Precisely, in support of government relations efforts, the media 
relations teams planned on “enlisting media outlets in the nation’s capital and elsewhere to 
convey key messages to federal policy makers” as a critical strategy point.69 Outside of financial 
performance, one of the three key messages was to highlight Monsanto’s corporate responsibility 
efforts relating to public policy, philanthropies, and education.70 Several tactics are detailed in 
the media relations plan spanning from the CEO, to investor relations, to “identify Business 
editors of local newspapers, create media list,” and to advance federal policy through a 
“Monsanto presence at the White House Correspondents Dinner.”71 Monsanto not only 
influenced regulatory and governmental bodies for favorable biotechnology regulations, but also 
influenced public opinion to create an amicable environment for its own corporate objectives. 
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In its science communications there was evidence of the blurring lines between the 
corporation and regulatory departments. Monsanto stated that it would implement biotechnology 
strategies in the “context of its overall commitment to the corporate social responsibility 
values.”72 For example, the Corporate Biotechnology Strategy Committee’s approach was to 
“create a favorable public atmosphere leading to responsible and meaningful government 
regulatory programs that will allow development, testing, and commercialization of 
biotechnology products.”73 One key tactic for the goal was to “ensure that Monsanto’s position is 
represented among key academic decision makers, think tanks, and other influentials who are 
able to advocate points of view which shape government policy in support of biotechnology.”74 
The aforementioned tactic was a clear example of Monsanto attempting to influence scientific 
work and influential scientific bodies to advance favorable biotechnology regulatory policy. In 
the 1980s, Monsanto focused on ensuring scientific communities understood the benefits of 
biotechnology. However, Monsanto efforts escalated over time to include various unethical 
scientific and business practices, culminating with numerous ghost-writing cases in the 21st 
century. 
Through an analysis of the desired responses from its government relations, media 
relations, and science communications teams, under direction of the corporate public affairs 
department, it is clear the Monsanto had, and continues to have, government relations and 
corporate influence ingrained in the company’s strategy. Government relations, media relations, 
and science communications were inherently interdisciplinary, spanning across divisions and 
geographic boundaries. The team’s descriptions make it clear that the goal was to influence 
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governments, regulatory bodies, scientific communities, and public opinion for the corporation’s 
benefit. The historical context revealed how the company escalated government relations and 
corporate public affairs measures throughout the 20th and 21st century to quicken biotechnology 
commercialization. 
Government Relations and Public Affairs Strategies 
 
After diving into the formulation and overview of the government relations department, it 
was vital to look at specific examples of corporate government affairs’ influence on government, 
regulatory bodies, scientific communities, and public opinion. Explicitly, the government 
relations department developed extensive biotechnology influential efforts, starting from 1980 to 
1989 through lobbying, advertising, and public relations to influence key decision maker’s 
opinions. The following plans and strategies are critical examples of Monsanto’s influence and 
demonstrate the company’s unethical business practices. 
Government Regulations and Business Relations Task Force  
 
In November 1980, John W. Hanley, the CEO of Monsanto Company, wrote a letter to 
President-elect Ronald Reagan. Reagan established a “Business Advisory Board’s Task Force on 
Government Regulation and Business Relations,” that Hanley was chairman of, to uncover 
regulatory burdens on industry.75 In addition to Hanley from Monsanto, eight other CEOs and 
presidents ranged across the industries from Prudential Insurance, Heizer Corporation, Merrill 
Lynch & Company, and Bankers Trust Corporation to advise the incoming Reagan 
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Administration.76 The task force produced a report, diving into three significant sections to 
uncover regulatory burdens such as rationalizing the regulatory system, restoring 
constitutionality to the regulatory system, and improving business-government relations.77 The 
report was a vital document to consider in-depth as it revealed larger industry goals with 
governmental bodies. Additionally, the report revealed Monsanto’s CEO’s goals and proposed 
solutions to counter perceived problems.78 The larger themes Hanley outlined are critical in 
shaping government relations strategies throughout the 1980s and later 20th century. 
The task force outlined uncontrolled costs, duplication, conflict, and obsolescence as 
significant problems in the regulatory system. Solutions from the task force were a cost-benefit 
and cost-effectiveness analysis of proposed regulations, setting a regulatory budget for the costs 
a regulation could impose, and deregulation through the new administration.79 Additionally, the 
delegation of legislative authority to agencies was a significant concern, and the task force 
recommended as possible solutions more congressional oversight and consolidation of regulatory 
agencies through presidential oversight.80 Hanley and Monsanto made it clear that the sheer 
number of regulations imposed and the complexity of agencies were harmful to business and a 
streamlined approach to regulations would ensure faster commercialization of firm’s products. 
Though the loosening of regulatory restrictions is not inherently unethical, Monsanto’s efforts 
led to the unethical safety commitment breach of Roundup with its consumers. 
The task force pointed to an anti-business bias in government as a significant problem. 
Specifically, “regulatory agency staff members tend to be inexperienced in business and industry 
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and reflect the anti-business bias.”81 Some solutions include presidential appointments that 
cultivate a more positive relationship between business and government, a revitalized Commerce 
department to unshackle “American business from excessive regulation,” and institutionalizing 
within government an “advocate of enterprise.”82 Hanley argued that a closer relationship 
between the public and private sector was necessary. The closer relationship between the public 
and private sectors, and a reduced number of regulations and simplification of agencies, are 
common themes in Monsanto government relations strategies throughout the 1980s. 
The task force’s recommendations fit with Reagan’s larger deregulatory philosophy and 
plans for the 1980s. The previous Ford and Carter administrations enacted deregulation for 
sectors ranging from financial services to air travel as a way of freeing companies from 
governmental oversight to allow the market to flourish.83 The Reagan administration built off its 
predecessors, but with a more far reaching approach.84 Specifically, earlier administrations 
enacted “regulatory reform” as a way to improve government effectiveness through regulation 
revisions.85 Whereas Reagan’s administration focused on “regulatory relief” to reduce the burden 
of regulations on corporations and consumers through the removal of regulations.86 This 
distinction demonstrated a new approach to regulations and regulatory bodies in the 1980s that 
aligned both with Monsanto and the other executives in the task force. 
Universities also played an influential role in identifying the task force’s issues and 
crafting its recommendations. The Gulf Universities Research Consortium (GURC), made up of 
17 schools ranging from Rice University to the University of Alabama, President James Sharp 
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sent a letter to Paul Howell, a member of the Reagan Industry Advisory Committee, with an 
attached document of regulatory reform research that shaped Howell’s input. The GURC report 
stated that government and agencies formulated regulations with a lack of industry knowledge, 
and that the regulations were overly complex and adversely affected productivity, innovation, 
and costs in American businesses.87 GURC asserted that the government enacted most 
regulations from “fear and uncertainty rather than knowledge,” and Congress and academia 
counterbalanced with efforts to investigate and simplify regulations.88  The GURC’s influence 
depicted the close relationship between educational institutions and businesses. The partnership 
is another central theme utilized throughout Monsanto corporate strategies. 
1981-1985 Biotechnology Plans 
 
 In addition to direct influence in presidential policy formulation and regulatory plans, the 
Monsanto Company developed many initiatives to influence government, regulators, and public 
opinion to shape policies on new biotechnologies. Monsanto leaders outlined efforts via 
government relations and public affairs departments to shape public opinion, regulatory 
agencies, and all levels of government to create a positive view of Monsanto and its 
biotechnology products and programs. The strategies ultimately blurred the line between the 
regulated and regulators. The cross-over is evident in a series of letters, from previously 
confidential internal Monsanto company documents, public policy plans, public relations plans, 
and congressional testimonies from 1981 to 1985.  
Monsanto knew from as early as 1981 that the government relations department would 
need to “formulate a public policy” and “shape government/legislative and public opinion 
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environment” to ensure a favorable view of biotechnology research and commercialization.89  
For example in 1982, a review of biotechnology public opinion and regulation made it evident 
that the company would face more regulations and issues as the science progressed.90 
In 1983, Monsanto established the Biotechnology Government and Public Relations 
Committee in response to a threat of more regulations and as a “mechanism to focus and 
coordinate at the corporate level our [Monsanto’s] biotechnology program, external relations 
with the regulatory and legislative community, with the press, state and local officials, trade 
associations, international organizations and think tanks and national opinion leaders.”91 The 
board was established by Dr. Schneiderman under the direction of Chairman Will Carpenter. 92 
As chairman of the committee, Carpenter created a unified corporate policy spanning 
across Monsanto business units from corporate research & development, public affairs, 
regulatory affairs, state government relations, environmental policy, and several others.93 The 
main Monsanto product areas the committee focused communications on were agricultural, 
animal health, and personal health care products.94 The committee was a part of the more 
extensive Biotechnology-Government Relations department to cultivate favorable public 
perception and government regulations on Monsanto biotechnology products.95 As a result of the 
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creation of the committee in 1983, the “first visits to government agencies to discuss regulation 
were made.”96 
Specifically, through internal coordination from the committee, Monsanto business units 
hoped to “draft and recommend Monsanto position on emerging legislative regulatory or public 
opinion issues.”97 The Monsanto government relations department influence spanned across 
internal business units from public relations, the Washington office, state government, and law, 
for complete mobilization.98 The company developed and cultivated corporate literature, local 
community initiatives, and press relationships to advance their pro-biotechnology message.99 To 
achieve policy goals, the department aimed to establish a comprehensive contact network of 
regulatory agencies and congressional staff.100 Additionally, the company developed 
relationships with “trade associations, think tanks, and public interest groups and academia,” and 
met with senior members of the administration to cultivate a favorable biotechnology climate.101  
In 1984, the committee aimed for no new legislation regarding biotechnology and met 
with groups ranging from the Office of Management and Budget to EPA Administrator 
Ruckelshaus “to establish a better understanding of biotechnology among the regulatory 
community.”102 Additionally, the committee organized a visit of 20 EPA personnel to Monsanto 
company headquarters in St. Louis “to brief them regarding the status and goal of the 
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biotechnology program.”103 Furthermore, the newly formed committee “effectively participated 
in states and local biotechnology issues, proposed legislation and proposed regulation to the 
extent that we were a significant factor in decisions in Colorado and California as well as 
providing inputs to a number of other governmental bodies.”104 The early 1980 efforts 
demonstrate how Monsanto’s strategy focused on cultivating a closer relationship between the 
public and private sector and curtailing the amount of regulations to ensure timely biotechnology 
research and commercialization. 
 Numerous letters between Monsanto company leaders detail the inner workings of the 
Biotechnology Government and Public Relations Committee. In early August 1984, W.D. 
Carpenter, a key figure in the committee, wrote that “there will be accelerated interest in 
biotechnology in the next 18 months on the part of Congress, the media, activist groups, and the 
agencies.”105 In preparation, he noted that “Monsanto has preempted the socially responsible 
position,” but he argued for public and government relations efforts to overcome trade 
association issues.106 Throughout the year, Monsanto provided laboratory tours and experiences 
to government officials, the media, and regulatory officials such as the EPA, USDA, and Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) in hopes of creating favorable relationships.107 Carpenter wrote 
at the beginning of February 1985 of the committee’s many accomplishments in 1984.108 Mainly, 
“the Monsanto message of the need for scientifically based regulations...has become the message 
of industry, environmentalists, government and Congress,” indicating the effect the government 
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and public relations departments had on policy and public opinion.109 However, he stated that 
environmental organizations still needed more ecological data before they would be 
convinced.110  
Throughout the 1980s, numerous Monsanto Company employees served as expert 
witnesses before Congress on biotechnology issues. In June 1984, Dr. John Marvel, a General 
Manager in the Research Division at Monsanto, and Dr. Will Carpenter, a Monsanto General 
Manager of Technology and head of the government relations subcommittee, testified before the 
House of Representatives Agriculture Committee on Department Operations, Research and 
Foreign Agriculture.111 Marvel painted biotechnology as a strategic tool “to ensure that man’s 
food supplies are met” through genetically engineered microbial pesticides and plants.112 Marvel 
asserted that excessive regulation could hamper innovation and the need for government 
protection in order to prosper.113 Carpenter echoed Marvel and stated the “regulations should be 
effective, scientifically based and implemented under existing laws” and that “new legislation is 
unnecessary.”114 Furthermore, Carpenter asserted that unlike previous regulations, biotechnology 
presented a “rare opportunity for industry and government to work together early” to create a 
favorable market for Monsanto product commercialization.115 Marvel and Carpenter's 
testimonies are significant examples of corporate lobbying and Monsanto’s influence on 
lawmakers and governmental bodies to limit regulations and create a closer private and public 
relationship in the 1980s. 
 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Testimony of Dr. John Marvel in House of Representatives, June 7, 1984, series 1, box 2, folder 4: 
Biotechnology (Policy Program Source Book) - 1986 (2), Monsanto Company Records. 
112 Ibid., 3. 
113 Ibid., 8. 
114 Testimony of Dr. Will D. Carpenter in House of Representatives, page 1-2, June 7, 1984, series 1, box 2, folder 
4: Biotechnology (Policy Program Source Book) - 1986 (2), Monsanto Company Records. 
115 Ibid., 4. 
 32 
 In 1985, many of the overarching government relations goals built off the 1984 objectives 
and accomplishments for the Biotechnology Government Relations & Public Relations 
Committee. Monsanto hoped to continue to increase exposure and education on its research in 
biotechnology.116 In regards to federal regulatory programs, the “emphasis in 1985 is [was] to 
limit legislative activity and encourage regulatory implementation and develop non-industry 
support...for this result.”117 Beyond just the federal level, in 1985, Monsanto hoped to support its 
biotechnology program through state and international initiatives.118 
For example in 1985, Monsanto launched a comprehensive state biotechnology 
advertising and public affairs program in Columbus, Ohio and Columbia, South Carolina.119 
Monsanto’s Biotechnology Government Relations Committee and the Biotechnology 
Communications Task Force created a series of activities in July, August, and September for 
state government leaders and the general public in an attempt to counter low public awareness of 
biotechnology and to proactively build a positive public consensus of both biotechnology and 
Monsanto.120 Monsanto selected Columbus and Columbia as locations for the program due to 
their population sizes and large universities.121  
The advertising program consisted of television and newspaper print advertisements.122 
The television advertisement was shown 131 times in Columbus and 92 times in Columbia over 
the three months.123 Four different print advertisements depicting how biotechnology could solve 
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world hunger were published eight times in each city over the same time frame.124 In addition to 
the advertising campaign, Monsanto organized a comprehensive media tour, direct mail to civic 
leaders, a survey to top business leaders on the economic potential of biotechnology, and 
numerous speeches.125 Monsanto even commissioned an exhibit at Columbus’s Center of 
Science and Industry (COSI), titled “Genetic Engineering; Understanding the Nature of Change” 
that provided interactive and educational exhibits on biotechnology and genetic engineering.126 
The COSI exhibit was received with widespread acclaim, with COSI having “its biggest day of 
attendance in history” on August 24, 1985, coinciding with the Monsanto exhibit launch.127 
The advertising and public affairs plan played a crucial role in influencing public and 
governmental officials’ views on the new science, indicating the broad range of ways the 
Monsanto Company systematically altered public opinion. The program was widely successful 
for the Monsanto corporation; in the 1985 post-plan survey of Ohio business leaders, 80% of the 
200 respondents responded: “Yes, make more effort” to “Do you believe Ohio state government 
should make a greater effort to encourage the development of the genetic engineering 
industry.”128 The favorable biotechnology news and benefits to Ohio agricultural and business 
investments were publicly released through newspapers such as the Columbus Dispatch, further 
 
124 Ibid., 11. 
125 Monsanto Platform - Biotechnology, page 12, 1985, series 1, box 2, folder 4: Biotechnology (Policy Program 
Source Book) - 1986 (2), Monsanto Company Records. Letter from Vern Riffe, Ohio House of Representatives 
Speaker, page 118, August 9, 1985, series 1, box 2, folder 4: Biotechnology (Policy Program Source Book) - 1986 
(2), Monsanto Company Records. 
126 Kurt Stull COSI Press Release, page 108, 1985, series 1, box 2, folder 4: Biotechnology (Policy Program Source 
Book) - 1986 (2), Monsanto Company Records. 
127 Letter from Barabara Wolfe to John Mussey, page 119, September 3, 1985, series 1, box 2, folder 4: 
Biotechnology (Policy Program Source Book) - 1986 (2), Monsanto Company Records. 
128 Biotechnology Poll Results, page 115, 1985, series 1, box 2, folder 4: Biotechnology (Policy Program Source 
Book) - 1986 (2), Monsanto Company Records. 
 34 
supporting Monsanto’s campaign and demonstrating the methods the company used to cultivate 
positive public, governmental, and business opinions for biotechnology and its products.129 
A significant part of the Monsanto government relations strategy for biotechnology 
regulation was engaging academia, professional societies, and environmental organizations in the 
conversations to bridge the divide between academia and the private sector.130 Concerning 
academia, in 1985, Dow, DuPont, and Monsanto joined together to sponsor a conference at 
Cornell University to provide education for biotechnology and open a dialogue with 
environmental organizations.131 Additionally, Monsanto specifically mentioned MIT, University 
of Texas, Rutgers University, University of Nebraska, and University of Minnesota as critical 
academic and university contacts.132 Regarding professional society influence, Monsanto worked 
with the American Society for Microbiology, American Chemical Society, and numerous other 
organizations to provide a dialogue about biotechnology for preeminent scientists in the biology 
field.133 Additionally, Monsanto organized countless symposiums in 1985 and 1986 to shape a 
positive dialogue surrounding biotechnology regulation amongst environmental organizations 
and worked closely with the National Wildlife Foundation and Environmental Law Institute, 
amongst others.134 Monsanto’s efforts to influence scientific communities and professional 
organizations, supported the larger corporate public affairs and government relations strategies to 
gain support from key stakeholders and gatekeepers in biotechnology commercialization. 
From 1980 to 1985, the government relations affairs and corporate public affairs plans 
systematically influenced the government and public to support Monsanto agricultural and 
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biotechnology products. The early 1980s plans focused efforts on governmental and regularly 
body influence, shaping public opinion through media plans, and interacting and gaining support 
in scientific communities. The strategies are part of a larger historical context of the influential 
business practices that culminated in the contemporary cases regarding Roundup. Furthermore, 
the 1980 to 1985 plans laid the foundation for more aggressive corporate influence on regulatory 
and governmental bodies, public opinion, and scientific communities, from 1986 to the end of 
the Reagan administration in 1989. 
1986 Biotechnology Plan  
 
Monsanto methodically documented its plans to influence governmental and regulatory 
bodies, public opinion, and scientific communities and align regulators with company strategic 
goals. In 1986 the company put together a public affairs program and budget summary that 
described the overarching goal as to help “the ‘public’ who shape regulatory and legislative 
policy in the country understand the benefits and safety of biotechnology” and commercialize 
biotechnology products.135 The plan focused on government and regulatory agencies, the 
scientific community, media relations, and educational institutions as the key targets of corporate 
influence. 
 The plan focused first on high-level government attention, meaning an understanding of 
biotechnology’s economic benefits by the president and heads of regulatory agencies to speed up 
the commercialization process.136 Secondly, congressional action to ensure that there was a 
favorable environment in Congress for supportive biotechnology regulatory policies.137 Thirdly, 
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thought leader attention to cultivating positive views amongst academics, think tanks, and the 
environmental community to provide public support to regulatory agencies.138 Lastly, local 
community acceptance, media relations, and employee communications were all lumped together 
to cultivate excellent views on biotechnology to counter any anti-biotechnology advocates.139 In 
total, Monsanto allocated $3,184,000 for the 1986 public affairs plan. Broken down according to 
the four main sections of program costs Monsanto dispersed $530,000 to high-level government 
action, $220,000 to congressional action, $465,000 to thought leaders, and $750,000 to local 
community acceptance.140 
 Within high-level government understanding, the focus was on briefing materials, US 
advocacy support, regulatory blueprinting, and a national corporate advertising program.141 
Monsanto focused its 1986 efforts on congressional leadership, legislation, an expanded 
government contact program, US presidential platform endorsement, and international liaison 
programs.142 Monsanto also concentrated its efforts on university contacts, thought leaders, 
independent biotechnology policy institutes, and coordination with trade association programs to 
establish favorable environments and views of biotechnology products and regulation.143 
Universities were essential to Monsanto’s strategy as a way to “educate congressional leaders 
and senior administration policy developers” and strengthen the university-government-industry 
relationship.144 Community relations programs, media relations, and employee communications 
mostly focused on crisis response plans, information kits, public opinion research, and clear 
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communication plans to Monsanto employees.145 The plans depict how the business tactics are a 
part of a larger corporate strategy that evolved into 21st century litigations.  
In addition to the overarching public affairs plan in 1986, Monsanto devised a bovine 
somatotropin (BST) specific public affairs plan to promote the product using similar methods to 
target similar audiences and stakeholders. BST, otherwise known as bovine growth hormone, is a 
drug used on dairy cows to increase milk production. In September 1986, the BST project was at 
a “critical stage” due to concerns with the technology’s product safety which led to talks in 
Congress of legislative action.146 Thus, Monsanto stated that there was a need for a 
“comprehensive public affairs program to counter these negative forces.”147 The devised plan 
encompassed “public relations, government relations and key influence group contacts” to build 
support for the biotechnology product among the four target audiences: federal and state 
government affairs, key influence groups, and the general public.148 The plan laid out a specific 
and strategic timeline for actions from 1986 to 1988 in preparation for the product’s introduction 
in 1989.149 
One key action point of the plan was to develop a public relations plan to address the 
BST concerns.150 The main strategies of the program were to be proactive in the media, 
preemptive with the government, diffuse criticism, generate farmer support, and drive public 
comprehension.151 Monsanto hired part-time lobbyists, developed relationships with 
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congressional staff, and generated support and “allies” in dairy state capitals.152 Monsanto also 
planned to “ghost-write OpEd pieces, [and] sample editorials” in late 1987.153 Ghost-written 
media and scientific work was designed to manipulate public opinion in favor of corporate goals 
and claims. The writings were an unethical approach to shaping public opinion and 
foreshadowed the company’s future practices. 
Political support was sought out by Monsanto through identifying critical contacts in the 
federal government, agricultural groups, and activist groups.154 Monsanto’s main BST goals 
concerned identifying contacts that could impact the political process on all levels of local, state, 
and federal governments.155 Monsanto focused on reaching as many people and contacts as 
possible to deliver a positive message about BST, while preparing for House hearings and 
congressional initiatives concerning BST.156 However, Monsanto made it clear that “no effort 
should be made to exert influence on the FDA decision.”157 Instead, the plans focused on 
preparing people for adverse reactions in the public arena and gaining a trusted support base for 
BST to later launch a political support arm.158 Though acknowledging the regulatory bodies, the 
statement supporting the FDA was contradictory to the developments of 1980-1986 where the 
company attempted to dramatically scale back regulations. Furthermore, Monsanto shaped public 
opinion, created close partnerships with scientific communities, and influenced governmental 
and regulatory bodies to craft pro-biotechnology regulations throughout the early 1980s. Thus, 
 
152 Ibid., 2. 
153 Ibid., 2. 
154 BST Public Affairs Plan, page 2, September 1986, series 1, box 2, folder 6: Biotechnology (Public Affairs Plan), 
Monsanto Company Records. 
155 BST Public Affairs Plan - Attachment 2, page 1, September 1986, series 1, box 2, folder 6: Biotechnology 
(Public Affairs Plan), Monsanto Company Records. 
156 Ibid., 1. 
157 Ibid., 1. 
158 Ibid., 1. 
 39 
Monsanto’s support of the FDA and regulations loses all credibility and impact, as the company 
played a role in targeting and influencing the regulatory body to Monsanto’s own benefit. 
1987 Government Relations Support 
 
The government relations department continued to gain momentum and devised 
comprehensive strategies to influence regulatory bodies, public opinion, and scientific 
communities to serve the interests of Monsanto. The plans in 1987 detailed continued unethical 
business practices, part of the larger corporate strategy at the Monsanto Company. In 1987, 
similar to past years, the main focus of government and public relations was “executive and 
legislative brand communications, public communications, and employee communications.”159 
In 1987, the CEO of the Monsanto Company, Richard Mahoney, stated that “Monsanto fought 
early for a strong regulatory climate to earn the public’s trust” and that the process “needs to be 
free to operate” independently of increased regulation and meddling.160 In 1987 Monsanto 
enlisted as public relations counsel Hill and Knowlton (H&K) in a $1,255,000 yearlong contract 
to advance Mahoney’s strategy.161 The million-dollar contract indicated the financial investment 
and importance placed on corporate public affairs and media relations to shape public opinion 
that Monsanto was willing to make. 
 In 1987, Monsanto prepared for several executive and legislative branch communications 
in a systematic effort to advance biotechnology commercialization and ensure a favorable 
regulatory environment. One of the key influential leaders that Monsanto targeted was Vice 
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President George H. Bush. While visiting St. Louis University, Bush stated that the 
biotechnology developed by Monsanto could mean great things for American farmers and the 
agricultural sector.162 Bush argued that “the machinery of government does not discourage 
innovation” and that the “work of coordinating our regulatory efforts is proceeding smoothly.”163 
Bush also stated that the government “must do a better job of protecting our [American business] 
intellectual property from infringement by competitors.”164 These statements echoed the main 
goals of the earlier Monsanto government relations plans. The themes of a closer public and 
private sector relationship and the government creating a favorable regulatory climate for 
Monsanto biotechnology commercialization echoed CEO Hanley’s initial strategy in 1980. 
Bush’s speech was both the result of a systemic corporate attempt by Monsanto to shape public 
and governmental opinion throughout the 1980s and Reagan era deregulatory policies. 
 In addition to the executive branch, Monsanto focused its efforts on gaining support 
amongst American legislative bodies in 1987. Monsanto broke down Washington contacts in 
Congress by company officials to maximize influence. Specifically, key Monsanto Company 
officials such as Mahoney, Harbison, Berra, Carpenter, Corbett, Reding, and Schneiderman were 
each assigned about four Congressmen or Senators to directly influence.165 Another report was 
drafted listing congressional committees and members who might have an interest in 
biotechnology, broken out by issue.166 The report was used to create talking points and issues to 
advocate Monsanto’s positions on competitiveness and environmental matters to sway 
 
162 Draft Speech for Vice President George Bush at St. Louis University, page 3, April 22, 1987, series 1, box 2, 
folder 5: Biotechnology (Programs) (1), Monsanto Company Records. 
163 Ibid., 6. 
164 Ibid., 6. 
165 Washington Contracts, page 1-3, 1987, series 1, box 2, folder 5: Biotechnology (Programs) (1), Monsanto 
Company Records. 
166 Congress-Biotechnology List, page 1, March 30, 1987, series 1, box 2, folder 5: Biotechnology (Programs) (1), 
Monsanto Company Records. 
 41 
governmental officials during visits.167 These reports revealed the extent to which Monsanto 
developed corporate strategies to gain key influential stakeholders and convince them of 
biotechnology’s benefits to enable commercialization of its products. 
 In addition to the thorough government relations plans, there was a robust media relations 
plan developed in 1987, that launched from July 1987 to July 1988 to continuously shape public 
opinion on biotechnology and the Monsanto Company.168 The objective of the plan was to 
“educate the media so they will convey Monsanto messages on biotechnology to public opinion 
leaders - at the federal, state and local levels - who will become constituents and reinforce 
Monsanto messages.”169 One of the main strategies was to “develop messages and materials 
based on the scientific knowledge and target them to the opinion leaders at all levels and to the 
general public.”170 Some of the target audiences of the plans were daily newspapers, magazines, 
members of Congress, “regulatory agency officials,” White House officials, senate officials, 
local officials, presidential candidates, and university officials.171 Through strategic media kits, 
message development, legislative action responses/news releases, and Monsanto spokespeople, 
Monsanto aimed to explain the benefits of biotechnology and gain public approval as an industry 
leader.172 Thus, the 1987 plan was aligned with earlier 1980 strategies, as a combination of 
media relations to influence public opinion along with a continued push by Monsanto to 
influence the Reagan administration, Congress, and regulatory agencies to advocate for 
Monsanto biotechnology. 
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1988 Government Relations Support 
 
Efforts continued as the century ended, with government relations plans ramping up in 
1988. The 1988 biotechnology strategy was broken up to highlight government communications, 
public interest/thought leaders, and media relations.173 In regards to government programs, the 
“economic potential for biotechnology will be the major emphasis for 1988,” especially with an 
emphasis on integration into congressional and presidential campaigns of 1988.174 In addition to 
briefing materials and an advocacy document, Monsanto created a “federal regulatory blueprint, 
responsive to corporate and industry needs, and sensitive to concerns and public environmental 
safety, [that] will be prepared for use in working with congressional candidates and Presidential 
candidates.”175 
 Specifically, in regards to congressional influence, Monsanto aimed to target 
congressional leadership through visits to Washington, DC, and St. Louis with a focus on 
“communication with core congressional leaders.”176 Additionally, Monsanto played an active 
role in influencing policies and actions through providing testimonies and influencing the 
amendment of certain biotechnology regulations.177 Monsanto targeted specific members of the 
executive branch such as cabinet officers, US trade representatives, and White House policy 
leaders from both Democratic and Republican policy groups.178 Monsanto specifically listed out 
agencies to work with, such as the “EPA, FDA, and USDA on implementation and development 
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of regulatory issues impacting biotechnology,” in addition to supporting presidential and 
congressional platforms that positively focused on biotechnology regulations.179 
 In regards to the public interest and thought leader programs, one of the initial goals was 
to work with universities and university leaders to “inform the government and the public about 
the advantages of biotechnology.”180 Additionally, Monsanto hoped to work with public policy 
influencers outside the government to “introduce our strategies to regulatory and legislative 
bodies, domestically and internationally.”181 This documentation was in combination with 
continued talks surrounding the creation of an independent biotechnology policy institute, 
different trade association programs, and comprehensive media and employee communications 
programs.182 
 Later in 1988, Monsanto held a corporate meeting in a St. Louis hotel to discuss media 
relations and government relations.183 David Brown was the Vice President of Government 
Affairs in 1988 and presented updates and goals regarding the department to corporate leaders.184 
Ultimately a significant point by Brown was that “policy issues at the local, state, and national 
levels will continue to have great impact on the company’s business activities.”185 The main goal 
for 1988, similar to those throughout the 1980s, was the “institution of appropriate Congressional 
and Executive branch regulatory policy on biotechnology and by no untimely governmental 
actions which will be detrimental to plans for commercial development.”186 Also, Monsanto 
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hoped to expand their advocacy reach via the political process and use its resources to “exert 
maximum influence on key business issues.”187 A major priority of government affairs was 
coordinating a united effort across all the business units within Monsanto regarding 
biotechnology, similar to the Government Regulations and Business Relations Task Force 
created in the early 1980s.188 In regards to state government relations, Monsanto hoped to shape 
legislative and regulatory bodies that affected corporate goals through “monitoring and lobbying 
resources in key states.”189 Ultimately, 1988 represented a step towards a more robust public 
relations and government relations program to influence key stakeholders and policymakers in 
the government and public, fitting in to the larger strategy to increase corporate influence. 
1989 Government Relations  
 
In February 1989, the Industrial Biotechnology Association (IBA) reached out to industry 
leaders, Monsanto being one of the most influential companies, to develop a Biotechnology Bill 
in the US Congress.190 Before reaching out to industry leaders, the IBA had already included 
many bill points such as increased FDA funding for more employees, increased number of 
biotechnology patent examiners in the Patent and Trademark Office, a research and development 
tax credit, and amendments to the Drug Export Act.191 All of the points aimed to speed up the 
approval process for corporate products. Monsanto advocated for four additional bill points such 
as increased patents on seeds and plants; import and domestic products regulation 
standardization; clarification of which regulations and agencies biotechnologies fell under for 
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commercialization; and an overall commitment by the US to maintain competitive commercial 
leaderships within the biotechnology industry.192 The recommended points echoed the same 
themes seen throughout the 1980s to advocate for a closer relationship with corporations and 
government to benefit corporate strategic initiatives. 
Monsanto met legislative resistance from governmental bodies in 1989. An internal 
memo from the H&K agency to Monsanto executives revealed several concerns surrounding 
biotechnology in Washington, DC. At an AgBIOTECH conference, Kathleen Merrigan, a Senate 
Agriculture Committee staffer, indicated that the 1990 Farm Bill “would prohibit federal funds to 
be used for herbicide-tolerant plant research.”193 The bill was a concern for Monsanto because 
though the company did not rely on federal funding, it sent a clear message against ag-biotech 
companies like Monsanto, that were conducting biotechnology research.194 Additionally, a 
meeting with US Senator Al Gore’s staff revealed his opposition to herbicide-tolerant crop 
research, which was problematic due to testing in his state.195 Furthermore, Jack Doyle, of the 
Environmental Policy Institute, questioned the safety of herbicide-tolerant crops and herbicides 
like Roundup.196 These concerns were met with Monsanto government relations strategies to 
influence key stakeholders and create an public environment positive to biotechnology research 
and commercialization. 
Thus, it is clear that the Monsanto Company completed a strategic effort spanning across 
company business units focusing governmental and regularly body influence, shaping public 
opinion through media plans, and interacting and gaining support in scientific communities to 
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pursue support for an aggressive biotechnology commercialization plan. Through numerous 
internal documents, budget plans, letters, and policy documents from the 1980s it is clear that 
Monsanto intended to influence governmental and regulatory bodies in the industry and towards 
the company’s favor. Monsanto blurred the line between the regulators and regulated through the 
biotechnology developments of the 1980s. The internal documents revealed a deep-rooted 
history of the unethical business practice concerns raised in the 21st century cases. Additionally, 
the analysis depicted the foundations of the company’s flawed business strategy that proved to be 
a major liability. 
After a comprehensive dive into the 1980s biotechnology policy documents, an analysis 
of the systematic approach to education and university influence by the Monsanto Company was 
necessary to fully grasp the scope of influence. Utilizing the contemporary Monsanto legal 
battles as a case study, with the context of governmental influence and media relations public 
opinion manipulation, an analysis of the efforts to shape business education systems by the 
Monsanto Company revealed the responsibility of the educational institutions and evident 
corporate reliance and influence. 
Monsanto and University Relationships 
 
 In 1987, Howard Schneidierman, the Senior Vice President of Research and 
Development (R&D) at the Monsanto Company, delivered a speech to a Conference Board on 
R&D and shared his views of university-corporate relations.197 Schneidierman stated that “one 
way to greatly enhance industrial competitiveness is to couple the talents of America’s research-
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driven industries with those of America’s universities.”198 Schneidierman explained that 
Monsanto “spends between $15 and $20 million per year on university research collaboration,” 
equating to “three percent of our [Monsanto] total R&D budget.”199 Additionally, he explained 
that there is an increasingly blurred line between basic and applied research, with product lines 
shrinking that made the need for accelerated research through partnerships even more 
significant.200  
Schneidierman warned that the relationship must be a partnership, not one in which the 
“university views the company as a source of funds.”201 In that vein, he stated that “universities 
are not corporate subsidiaries.”202 Schneidierman was a former dean, and stated the “no one tells 
a professor in an American university what to do,” so concerns regarding academic freedom are 
unfounded.203 He described the benefits of using a consultant professor position to “accelerate 
the application and exploitation and knowledge base created by our universities.”204 
Schneidierman described an ideal relationship between Monsanto and educational institutions for 
Monsanto, where the corporation reaps the benefits of applied industry research through the 
commercialization of scientific products. Additionally, Schneidierman made it clear that 
company reliance and partnerships with educational institutions is critical for the future of both 
his R&D department and the company at large. The efforts to partner with educational 
institutions for Monsanto’s benefit were detailed in the 1980s reports, but the efforts are rooted 
even further back in the company’s history. 
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 The talks surrounding university relations go back twenty years earlier, to a host of 
discussions and speeches given at a Monsanto conference in 1965. At the conference Dr. 
William Davidson, a Professor of Business Organization at The Ohio State University’s 
Graduate Business School, delivered a speech.205 Davidson was a director of the Executive 
Development Program at The Ohio State University from 1955-1958 and served as a consultant 
of management education and marketing management at various firms.206 Davidson 
communicated that there was an increased demand for “a combination of scientific or technical 
background and business knowledge,” specifically among MBAs with scientific backgrounds.207 
Davidson stated that the critical areas of expertise needed for technical people in the industry are 
marketing, management, and finance/accounting.208 Davidson’s speech highlights the necessity 
for scientist working at corporations like Monsanto to understand basic aspects of business. 
Davidson’s speech made it very clear that those individuals trained at business schools would be 
more valuable to a corporation, placing a great responsibility on business instruction on the 
educational institutions, as opposed to in-house company training and education. 
At the same Monsanto conference, there was a roundtable discussion from university 
professors and industry leaders on how to have more cooperation between the two groups. The 
discussion consisted of four different groups led by Monsanto leaders of various functions 
spanning from Assistant to the Vice President and a Marketing Personnel Planning Manager. A 
wide range of engineering and business universities were represented, including Vanderbilt 
University, Clemson University, University of Pennsylvania, Michigan State University, and 
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology.209 In the working session, the main topic of conversation 
included increased industry funding support, more industrial experience for faculty, and 
increased consulting projects with industry.210 There was consensus amongst the group that the 
Recruiting and College Relations programs should be kept separate.211 
In the discussion Shell, DuPont, and Dow were mentioned multiple times in comparison 
to Monsanto university relations, and an effort to have more industry-based lecturers was 
needed.212 The consensus on college campuses of the industry was the “image of engineering on 
the engineering campus was good.”213 However, on liberal arts campuses, it is more necessary to 
show how businesses are a public servant and how their roles can help humanity as a whole.214 
There was consensus that efforts to increase science and technology enrollment at universities 
was rooted in lackluster secondary school guidance an education.215 Several Monsanto 
initiatives, such as engaging seniors in high school and some national chapters, were mentioned 
as good initial programs, but further development would be needed.216 The roundtable discussion 
depicted how both groups called for increased cooperation and mutual benefits. However, 
Monsanto motives and reliance on educational institutions to instruct future employees and close 
relations with university professors across the country was clearly evident. 
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In addition to the conferences supported by Monsanto to encourage industry and 
university partnerships, Monsanto engaged in other activities to encourage relationships. One of 
which was through steadily increasing financial awards to American universities and colleges. In 
1952, the company distributed “13 graduate fellowships, one graduate scholarship, and seven 
grants-in-aid to various schools.”217 Monsanto distributed financial awards to 58 American 
universities totaling over $275,000 in 1953.218 In 1954, Monsanto gave out 57 distinct awards to 
44 American colleges and universities.219 In 1955, Monsanto distributed financial awards to 53 
American universities and 72 distinct aid awards including University of Pittsburgh, The Ohio 
State University, and University of Wisconsin.220  
In 1956, the Monsanto Vice President for Research, Development, and Engineering 
announced financial aid to 83 American universities in the form of fellowships, undergraduate 
scholarships, and cash grants.221 The Ohio State University received a fellowship along with 
Brown and Yale Universities.222 University of Michigan and Cornell University received 
undergraduate scholarships, along with numerous other institutions.223 Monsanto distributed 
grants to various university departments from Illinois University to St. Louis University as a part 
of the Aid-to-Education Program in 1956.224 In addition to financial aid, in 1964 12 chemistry 
and engineering professors from various leading scientific universities such as The Ohio State 
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University, University of Minnesota, and Brown University, visited the Monsanto research 
facilities and participated in a discussion surrounding new methods to encourage students to 
engage in technical disciplines.225 Monsanto clearly used the grants and funding as a way to 
cultivate closer relationships with universities and fund institutions that provided education to 
target future employees. 
Even before the comprehensive 1980s corporate public affairs plans, Monsanto’s reliance 
and influence on educational institutions is evident through grants, conference speeches, and 
executive strategies. From the historical analysis, it is evident that Monsanto viewed universities 
as both a tool to educate and recruit future employees, as well as a powerful scientific resource 
for collaboration. Monsanto relationships in the form of scholarships and fellowships to 
universities ultimately benefited the company in the long-term through employees and closer 
relationships with cutting edge scientists. Given the influence, support, and reliance on 
educational institutions as the main form of educational instruction at Monsanto, future research 
will need to analyze the faculty, curriculums, and classes taught at undergraduate institutions to 
ensure business school graduates are instructed on how to ethically interact with corporations, 
governmental and regulatory bodies, scientific communities, and the public.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: Discussion and Conclusions 
Conclusion 
 
Edwin Hardeman frequently used Roundup on his Gualala, California, home and his 56-
acre property in Santa Rosa. For close to three decades Hardeman used the herbicide as a tool to 
fight poison oak on his properties. On Christmas Day 2014, he discovered a swollen lymph node 
on his neck and later, a diagnosis of stage three non-Hodgkin lymphoma. Hardeman underwent 
six painful rounds of chemotherapy to fight the disease. Then in 2015, he saw a news report, 
describing how Roundup could lead to his exact form of cancer. Hardeman quickly filed a 
federal lawsuit against Monsanto in February 2016.226  
The court selected Hardeman as the first federal, and second overall, trial among 
hundreds of other cancer survivors and families to influence future ligation and impact many 
other settlements. Throughout the trial, the prosecutors argued that Hardeman’s exposure to 
Roundup caused his non-Hodgkin lymphoma and that Monsanto had knowledge of its dangerous 
effects. Through presented evidence and arguments, the jury was convinced that “Monsanto was 
negligent by not using reasonable care to warn about Roundup.”227  
The jury’s unanimous ruling supported Hardeman’s lawyer’s opening statement asking 
“How did Monsanto influence the science over the last 40 years?” and arguing that “Monsanto 
has influenced and manipulated the science through its relationships with regulatory officials and 
through ghostwriting.”228 Within five minutes of the verdict, Bayer AG announced that it would 
 
226 Sam Levin, "The family that took on Monsanto: 'They should've been with us in the chemo ward'," The 
Guardian. April 10, 2019. Accessed December 10, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/apr/10/edwin-
hardeman-monsanto-trial-interview.  
227 “Hardeman Jury Verdict Form Phase 2,” Baum Hedlund Aristei & Goldman, accessed March 18, 2020, 
https://www.baumhedlundlaw.com/pdf/monsanto-documents/Hardeman/Hardeman-Jury-Verdict-Form-Phase-2.pdf 
228 “Trail Transcript March 20, 2019,” U.S. Right to Know, last modified March 24, 2020, 
https://usrtk.org/monsanto-papers/federal-court/, 22-23. 
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appeal the decision. In response, Hardeman’s attorneys’ concluded that “It is clear from 
Monsanto’s actions that it does not care whether Roundup causes cancer, focusing instead on 
manipulating public opinion and undermining anyone who raises genuine and legitimate 
concerns about Roundup.”229 The company immediately faced a share price drop and backlash 
from investors as financial ramifications to the court’s decision.230  
Thousands of cases are still ongoing against Monsanto from people with similar cancer 
battles. The research required a step back from the court cases and current literature surrounding 
Monsanto to analyze the company’s government relations. It is evident that the unethical 
business practices found in the Monsanto Roundup trial released documents, such as ghost-
writing and unethical regulatory body influence, are a part of a larger corporate strategy of 
government relations and influence at the Monsanto Company. From its beginnings in corporate 
public affairs to the evolution of perfectly calculated government relations plans targeted at 
government officials, regulatory bodies, scientific communities, and public opinion throughout 
the 1980s, it is unmistakable that the issues are historically rooted in the company and its culture. 
Additionally, it is evident that Monsanto influenced, relied on, and created an unhealthy 
partnership with educational institutions. Monsanto officials engaged in unethical business 
practices, historically and into the present day, designed by the company as a way to expedite 
regulatory bodies in favor of speeding up commercialization for biotechnology products, such as 
Roundup. 
The unethical business practices found in the Monsanto Roundup trial are part of a larger 
strategy of government relations manipulation and influence at the Monsanto Company. 
 
229 “Verdict Is In – Monsanto Must Pay Cancer Victim $80 Million,” U.S. Right to Know, last modified March 24, 
2020, https://usrtk.org/monsanto-roundup-trial-tacker/verdict-is-in-monsanto-must-pay-cancer-victim-80-million/. 
230 Levin, “The family…”. 
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However, the strategy of corporate influence proved to be a lability for Monsanto. In both 
Johnson’s and Hardeman’s trials the breakdown between objective science and regulatory bodies 
with Monsanto contributed to the jury’s decision in favor of the plaintiffs. Ironically, in the end 
Monsanto needed unbiased scientific facts to counter claims. Nevertheless, decades of corporate 
public affairs influence and unethical business practices lost the company the impartial 
verification it needed and revealed the flawed corporate strategy. 
 It is incredibly imperative for Monsanto, other businesses, and educational institutions to 
understand the historical context and decades of unethical behavior that contributed to the 
contemporary legal battles. The Monsanto employees engaged in unethical business practices for 
decades and it is the responsibility of business schools and other educational institutions to train 
future business leaders and employees in ethical business practices and governmental relations, 
when company efforts are absent. The utilization of the Monsanto trials as a learning case and 
example for other corporations, the incorporation of ethical government relations into the 
undergraduate business curriculum, and the teaching of history across disciplines as a vital case 
study tool are several key recommendations to ensure that similar unethical practices and 
corporate influence do not continue. The historical findings and contemporary analysis are 
imperative to grasp so that corporations adapt to protect consumers and prevent similar cases in 
the future. 
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